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The Five Star Movement: Exception or
Vanguard in Europe?
Lorenzo Mosca
The enduring economic crisis, austerity measures and corruption scandals
have created a favourable environment for the advent of new political
actors all over Europe. During the last general elections (February 2013),
Italy was shocked by the inexorable rise of the Five Star Movement. Beppe
Grillo’s creature upset the political system, occupying portions of the
public sphere that had been ignored (the web) or gradually abandoned by
traditional political parties (the squares). Its unusual campaigning style, its
internet-based organisational structure, its atypical political positioning
(beyond left and right), and its oversimplification of complex problems all
help to explain its electoral performance, and distinguish it from similar
anti-establishment parties that have emerged in Europe over the past
decade.
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Contemporary political systems are seriously challenged by changes occurring both
at the supranational and at the national level. Globalisation has thrown into ques-
tion not only the role of the nation state, but also and more generally, the capacity
of politics to intervene in the economy and regulate social conflict.1 Recently, this
has been further worsened by the economic crisis as citizens blame the European
Union and governing parties for austerity measures that have led to cuts in social
spending, unemployment and higher taxation. At the same time, the mediatisation
of politics2 has deeply affected domestic politics transforming them into a show
observed passively by citizens in which parties have been replaced by leaders,
organisation by television, and ideology by marketing.3 Political corruption and
scandals exposed by the media have increased people’s cynicism and detachment
from politics.
Available Eurobarometer data collected since the end of 2003 clearly show that a
process of disenchantment toward traditional politics and institutions is at work in
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all member states of the European Union (EU).4 Data display an evident trend of
declining trust in national parliaments, national governments and domestic political
parties (Figures 1-3). However, when confronted with average levels of trust in the
EU, the Italian case appears even more dramatic. In fact, trust in the national
5 parliament is around 12 percent (-19 since the start of the observation period and
-14 during the past year) vs. the EU average of 26 percent (-9 in the last decade),
trust in the national government is around 11 percent (-16 since the start of the
observation period and -13 during the past year) vs. the EU average of 25 percent
(-6 in the last decade) and trust in political parties is around 7 percent (-4 since
10 the start of the observation period) vs. the EU average of 16 percent (+1 in the
past decade).
The corruption scandals of the early 1990s (Mani Pulite - Clean Hands) as well
as recent cases that have troubled all Italian parties, including those with an anti-
establishment rhetoric and opposing corruption, such as Lega Nord and Italia dei
15 Valori, have further decreased trust in traditional political parties.5
At the beginning of 2012, the treasurers of some of the main Italian parties were
put under investigation for illicit use of electoral reimbursements: among them
were Luigi Lusi (Margherita, one of the founding members of the Democratic
Party) and Francesco Belsito (Lega Nord). In September 2012, both Franco Fiorito,
20 leader of the Popolo della Libertà (PDL) group in the Lazio Regional Council, and










FIGURE 1. Trust in parliaments (percentages; Italy vs. European average).
Source: Eurobarometer (2003-13).
4http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm.
5Fella and Ruzza, “Populism and the Fall”; Mosca, “A year of social movements”.
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dals linked to the improper use of public funds, while in October of the same year,
the regional centre-right government headed by Roberto Formigoni in Lombardy
was forced to suspend the legislature prematurely due to the involvement of some
5of its members in cases of corruption, pork barrelling and external collusion with
the Mafia. An inquiry aired by the TV program ‘Report’ on October 28 revealed
Antonio di Pietro’s unscrupulous use of electoral reimbursements assigned to his
party, Italia dei Valori. Together with these events, parliament’s inability to change
the electoral law and to significantly reduce the cost of politics have further dis-
10credited political parties. Between April and May 2013, dozens of regional counsel-
lors in different regional assemblies (Campania, Calabria, Basilicata, Friuli-Venezia
Giulia, Veneto) were brought under investigation for improper use of public funds.
This situation opened up opportunities for outsiders in the political arena, and
these were grasped by an unusual political entrepreneur: the comedian Beppe
15Grillo and his Five Star Movement (FSM). Although the Italian case certainly has
specificities vis-à-vis other European countries, political phenomena that can be
paralleled to the Five Star Movement had already emerged in other Western
democracies in past decades. The case of the French comedian Coluche running
for president at the beginning of the 1980s has often been recalled.6 More recently,
20after the tremendous financial crisis of 2008, a well known comedian, Jon Gnarr,
was elected mayor of Reykjavik, in Iceland, with his Best Party collecting 34.7










FIGURE 2. Trust in national governments (percentages; Italy vs. European average).
Source: Eurobarometer (2003-13).
6Biorcio and Natale, Politica a 5 stelle.
7Boyer, “Simply the Best”.
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Beyond cases of comedians entering the political arena, recent elections all over
Europe have seen the success of anti-establishment parties at the local and/or
5 national level, such as the euro-sceptic United Kingdom Independence Party
(UKIP) in the UK, the radical left party Syriza and the radical right party Golden
Dawn in Greece, and the Piraten Partei and Alternative für Deutschland in
Germany (neither of which were however able to enter the Bundestag in the
September 2013 federal elections). Other new political parties continue to arise in
10 Europe, such as, the X Party Citizen Network – the Party of the Future, which
aims to pick up the legacy of the Indignados movement in Spain and whose unique
program is “Democracy, full stop”.8
Nevertheless, while the Five Star Movement has some features in common with
this new generation of political parties, it is also distinct from most of them for its
15 position beyond left and right and for its unusual organisational form, which is
heavily based on the web.
This article will provide a brief overview of how and when the Five Star Move-
ment arose, its differences and similarities with other anti-establishment groups in


















Grillo is a well known Italian comedian who became famous with his television
shows at the end of the seventies. During the 1980s, he was banned from public
television because of satire against the governing Socialist Party. He then decided
to move his shows to squares and theatres.9 His performances have always been a
10mix of political satire, social and environmental campaigns, consumer defence, etc.
After meeting with the communications expert Gianroberto Casaleggio in 2004, he
realised the importance of the internet and started a blog in 2005 that became very
successful. Initially, the blog represented an important hub for his fans all over the
country. In July 2005, he suggested that his supporters create local groups using
15the Meetup platform.10 As explicitly recognised by Casaleggio,11 this choice was
inspired by the American group MoveOn.12
Politics rapidly moved from the background to the foreground of Grillo’s
discourse and his fans were quickly transformed into activists13 who could easily
meet in person and define a local agenda.14 These groups were the basic cells that
20facilitated the emergence of the FSM a few years later.
The FSM’s organisational model presents some of the “post-bureaucratic” charac-
teristics that have been stressed by Bruce Bimber,15 in describing the emerging
groups of the “fourth information revolution”, generated by the advent of digital
media. Essentially, “post-bureaucratic” groups are based on an information infra-
25structure that replaces a material organisational infrastructure. The FSM’s immate-
rial infrastructure is basically the blog and the Meetup platform (social networks
like Facebook and Twitter were added later on).
The movement has clearly adopted some of the tactical innovations introduced
by MoveOn: a small coordinating staff, no offices, use of the internet for organisa-
30tional purposes, decision-making and fundraising. However, the two groups differ
in their relationship with members. While MoveOn opted for an open and inclu-
sive model (it is enough to subscribe to its online newsletter to be considered a
member), the FSM has adopted a closed and exclusive model (one has to subscribe
formally to the blog to become a member, sending a digital copy of an identity
9Vignati, “Challenge of Five-Star Movement”.
10Meetup is an online platform created in 2001, after 9/11, to connect people with similar interests on a
local scale. Its political potential emerged with the American presidential elections in 2004 when the demo-
cratic candidate, Howard Dean, employed it to encourage bottom-up participation in his campaign during
the primaries.
11http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wwp32DDRrck.
12MoveOn is an American advocacy group which started in 1998 as an online petition aimed at censuring
President Clinton’s involvement in the ‘sex gate’ affair and moving attention to other pressing issues. Since
then, it has built an internet-based community of more than 8 million Americans and become the leading
progressive organisation. It played an important role in Obama’s election (www.front.moveon.org/about).
Karpf, The MoveOn Effect.
13Biorcio and Natale, Politica a 5 stelle.
14Lanfrey, “Il MoVimento dei grillini”.
15Bimber, Information and American Democracy.
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5 card to the staff and declaring compliance with the ‘non-statute’ which excludes
anyone who is already a member of another political party or association whose
goals contrast with those of the movement). The current figures for members are
unknown but they were 255,339 at the beginning of December 2012, when the
online primaries were held.16 There are evident barriers to participation in the
10 movement. Only people registered on the blog can take part in the online
consultations concerning its strategic choices: selection of candidates running for
parliament, local elections (mayors and local representatives) or the presidency of
the republic, as well as the expulsion of dissidents.17 Other differences between
MoveOn and the FSM concern the charismatic leadership of Grillo, and the sal-
15 vific conception of the web as an instrument of direct democracy that can help
make the egalitarian slogans of the movement come true, both of which are absent
in the former. According to Grillo and Casaleggio,18 the internet is an instrument
of “disintermediation” between citizens and institutions, making it possible to
bypass typical mediators of representative democracy (such as political parties, trade
20 unions, etc.) and overcome the partisanship and factionalism of professional
journalists and mainstream media (particularly newspapers and television).
While MoveOn represented a clear reference in the early stages of the
movement, since then it has adapted itself to the particular set of challenges and
opportunities of the national context. From this point of view, the movement’s
25 history can be roughly divided into four phases: a) latency (2005-07); b) visibility
(2007-08); c) entry into the electoral arena (2008-11); d) electoral boom and
institutionalisation (since 2012).19
Phase 1: Latency in the web (2005-07)
The phase of latency started when Grillo set up his blog in January 2005 and
30 invited his fans to create groups on Meetup called “Beppe Grillo’s friends” in the
same year. While the blog was the movement’s unique voice, the Meetup groups
served as its territorial backbone. In this phase, Grillo gradually put aside his role
as a comedian and became a political entrepreneur.20 At the same time, supporter
groups started to form on Meetup and get to know each other. Meetup provided a
35 locus for the aggregation of Grillo’s fans, for staying in contact and for promoting
projects of active citizenship in the local domain. Public visibility and media cover-
age of the movement were extremely limited at this phase and the new (pre)politi-
16Lanzone, “Dai Meetup al Parlamento”.
17Unlike MoveOn, online consultations have never been used by the FSM to consult its base on substantial
issues (i.e. controversial long-term issues or bills to be discussed in local or national assemblies).
18Grillo and Casaleggio, Siamo in guerra.
19Mosca, La webpolitica.
20Biorcio and Natale, Politica a 5 stelle.
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cal creature was known only to the limited circuit of supporters and activists.
According to Passarelli et al.,21 the role of Meetup changed considerably from the
5first to the second phase: while it acted mostly as a platform for online discussion
during the former, during the latter it facilitated activists’ face-to-face meetings.
Phase 2: Visibility through mass protests (2007-08)
During this phase, Grillo’s fans moved from the web and the local domain to the
squares, and their mobilisation acquired national resonance. Two massive public
10events were organised through the internet and mobilised hundreds of thousands
of people. These events generated attention and (often negative) media coverage
legitimising this new political actor (still far from forming a political party to
compete in the electoral arena). The two events were called ‘V-days’ for different
reasons: a) V stands for Vaffanculo (f*** off), an insult directed at politicians and
15journalists; b) V also recalls a famous graphic novel by Alan Moore and David
Lloyd, V for Vendetta, set in a futuristic UK after a nuclear war led by a totalitarian
government opposed by the anonymous anarchist revolutionary ‘V’; c) V-day also
recalls the ‘D-day’ landing of the Allies in Normandy during the Second World
War; and finally d) V stands for ‘5’ in Roman numerals and refers to the five stars
20(water, environment, mobility, development, energy) that Grillo and his supporters
think should inspire local governments’ action (see next section for more details).
These protest events served to define and provide a concrete reference to the move-
ment’s fluid identity and to build a sense of solidarity among participants beyond
the local level, also by pointing to the “enemies” of the movement: above all,
25traditional political parties and mainstream media.
On 8 September 2007,22 the first V-day against the “caste of politicians” was
held in Bologna and in other Italian cities to collect signatures for a popular law
initiative demanding a “clean parliament”. It called for a ban from parliament of
all persons convicted; reform of the electoral system allowing voters to express
30preferences for individual candidates; a limit of two terms in parliament; and the
prohibition to hold two elected posts at the same time. On 25 April 2008,23 the
second V-day against the “caste of journalists” took place in Turin and in other
Italian squares collecting signatures for a popular law initiative to abolish subsidies
to the publishing industry, cancel the Gasparri Law (regulating the media system)
35via a referendum, and eliminate the official journalist register. In both cases, the
initiatives collected hundreds of thousands of signatures but were not taken into
consideration by the Italian parliament. After the success of the first V-day, Grillo
proposed that his supporters set up civic lists “certified” by him and his staff to
21Passarelli et al., “Dentro il Movimento”.
22A date evoking the armistice between the Kingdom of Italy and the ‘Allies’ during World War II that
symbolised the end of the fascist regime but also opened up a period of chaos in the country.
23National holiday recalling the day of liberation from Nazi-Fascism.
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participate in local elections. This decision paved the way for the creation of the
5 FSM and its entry into the electoral arena.
Phase 3: Entry into the electoral arena (2008-11)
Although it did not produce amazing results, the FSM’s first attempt to participate
in local elections was judged positively by Grillo and his staff. It became
immediately evident, however, that in order to expand its electoral appeal, a
10 common symbol and a common name were needed to create a unique reference
for Grillo’s supporters and to avoid the creation of fake lists evoking the leader’s
name in their party symbols.24 The creation of the FSM was preceded by some
important events. First, the approval of the Carta di Firenze (Florence Charter),
drafted in a meeting held in Florence on 9 March 2009, in which the people
15 drawing up the certified electoral lists, Grillo’s supporters and members of Meetup
groups got together to define a common program identifying the main issues that
should drive the action of local government – the so-called five stars: water, envi-
ronment, mobility, development and energy. Second, in July 2009, Grillo provoca-
tively announced that he would run in the centre-left Democratic Party’s (DP)
20 primary elections for the new party secretary. Although it is not clear if Grillo
really wanted to participate in the primaries, the DP’s board did not accept his
candidature. On 10 October, the FSM was officially born and two months later a
‘non-statute’ regulating the functioning of the ‘non-party’ was made public.25 The
non-statute clearly underlined the strategic role of the web and also the persona-
25 lised nature of the FSM, as Grillo was indicated as the sole owner of the logo and
the name of the movement. Another interesting aspect of the document concerns
the prohibition for people having criminal convictions (Grillo himself26) to run for
election.
The FSM initially participated only in local elections (that is in areas where
30 Meetup groups were already present and able to form a list). In the regional
elections of 2010, it obtained positive results in the northern regions but was weak
in central-southern areas.27
Phase 4: Electoral boom and institutionalisation (since 2012)
The real turning point in the movement’s electoral results came with the local
35 elections of May 2012, when it elected four mayors (one in the city of Parma) and
obtained more than 10 percent of votes in many northern areas.28 After that
24In Italian, ‘Grillo’ means ‘cricket’ and puns ( with Pinocchio’s cricket) have often been used by fake lists
to steal the votes of Grillo’s supporters.
25Fornaro, “Un non-partito”.
26Grillo has a conviction for manslaughter. The car he was driving on a mountain road in 1980 crashed
and three of his four passengers were killed.
27Tronconi, “The Italian regional elections”.
28Pinto and Vignati, “Il successo e i dilemmi”.
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‘electoral boom’, the movement’s rise seemed unstoppable: it became the most
voted party in the Sicilian regional elections of November 2012 and the first party
(excluding the votes of Italians residing abroad) in the lower chamber of parliament
5in the general elections of February 2013.
While the early stages of the movement were mostly web-based, its massive
success from 2012 onward was largely related to Grillo’s choice to actively
campaign in the squares. While he refuses to take part in TV shows (as he
considers them part of the immoral system he wants to fight), the mass media
10could not ignore him as crowds of people participated in his rallies all over the
country and because the par condicio law obliges public television to provide equal
coverage for all competitors during an electoral campaign.
Concerning the most important aspects of the FSM program, Passarelli et al.29
have stressed in particular neo-environmentalism and the moralisation of politics.
15On the one hand, most of the movement’s proposals have been developed with
reference to the local level concerning environmental issues. On the other, the
movement proposes an anti-establishment discourse against the ‘caste’ of politicians
that is said to enjoy privileges and that should be suppressed.30 Hence, the
movement asks for a drastic reduction in the cost of politics and a limit on terms
20in parliament and in local councils in order to give all citizens the possibility to
engage in politics for a limited period of time. In this framework, political inexperi-
ence is considered a strength rather than a weakness.
With the entry into the national parliament of 163 representatives in February
2013, the movement entered a phase of ‘institutionalisation’,31 characterised by
25tensions mostly related to its fast growth and the unsolved question of the relation-
ship between Grillo (unelected leader) and the movement’s representatives. The
cohesion of the parliamentary group has been bedevilled by Grillo’s brusque refusal
to enter into any kind of political alliance (that is a coalition government with the
DP), and dissent and/or criticism have been punished with expulsion. In addition,
30the issues of cuts to the salaries of the movement’s own members of parliament
(cuts to the salaries of all MPs was part of the party’s platform) and of dissidents’
expulsion monopolised the FSM’s political agenda for a long time, offering an
image of conflict among themselves. The local elections of summer 2013 saw the
first serious defeat of the FSM with only three mayors elected in minor Italian
35cities. The result has to be related to the limited effectiveness of the FSM’s
presence in the national parliament.
29Passarelli et al., “Dentro il Movimento”.
30This anti-establishment claim has been made in a very virulent way by Grillo: in his words politicians are
“zombies” who steel money and now have to hand over the floor to honest citizens.
31Gualmini, “Da movimento a partito”.
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The indiscrete charm of anti-politics
How did this rapid and partly unexpected success come about? How was the
movement able to nationalise and gather support from people with different
5 territorial, social and political connotations? There are two main explanations:
1) The first is contextual and strictly related to the incapacity of domestic
politics to bring about badly needed reforms (changing the electoral law,
suppressing the provinces, cutting the cost of politics, etc.), but also to the
continuous scandals exposing corruption in all political parties (including those,
10 such as Lega Nord and Italia dei Valori, that were successful because of their fight
against corrupt politics);
2) The second reason concerns the movement’s ability to grasp the opportunity
to fill the vacuum in the political arena, presenting itself as pure, distinct from
traditional parties and uncompromised.
15 This has been done in a number of ways:
a) Effective electoral campaigns mixing pre-modern and post-modern features:32
face-to-face rallies, the active role of activists, low costs covered by online fundrais-
ing, but also the use of communications consultants (Casaleggio and his staff) and
interactive web platforms;33
20 b) Grillo’s ability to occupy portions of the public sphere (the web and the
squares) almost ignored by other competitors (mostly focused on television), creat-
ing tremendously attractive events for the media: for example, Grillo opened the
campaign for the regional elections in Sicily by swimming across the Strait of Mes-
sina, while the campaign for the general elections (called ‘Tsunami tour’) ended up
25 with hundreds of thousands of people listening to him in Piazza San Giovanni in
Rome.
c) The use of the Meetup platform as the territorial backbone of a movement
initially lacking territorial organisation, media access and material resources. During
the phases discussed above, the territorial spread of Meetup groups changed signifi-
30 cantly. According to a survey carried out on 1 October 2012, the active groups on
Meetup totalled 502:34 2012 alone saw the creation of 221 new groups, which
amounts to 44 percent of those created since 2005 when Grillo first suggested the
adoption of the platform to the movement’s activists. The dates on which these
groups were set up show that there were different waves, corresponding to the
35 phases mentioned above: latency; visibility (including the entry into the electoral
32Norris, A virtuous circle.
33Mosca and Vaccari, “Il Movimento e la rete”.
34Mosca, “A year of social movements”.
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arena); and the electoral boom. During the first phase, 99 groups were formed:
one fifth of the total. During the second phase, 201 groups were formed, two-fifths
of the total. In the third phase, following the victory in the municipalities of
Parma, Mira, Sarego and Comacchio, 182 new groups were created: a remarkable
5number if one considers that they appeared in the five months spanning the
summer, notoriously an adverse time for political engagement.35 The geographic
distribution of the groups is also worth noting: matching the territorial distribution
with the movement’s various phases of development gives some very meaningful
results.36 During the first two phases, the Meetups tended to be concentrated in
10the north and the ‘red’ area of Italy (the traditionally leftwing area of the country).
These accounted for over 60 percent of Meetups, and corresponded to the places
where, over time, the movement achieved its best electoral results.37 However, after
the May 2012 local elections, the distribution of the Meetups went through some
extremely significant changes: almost half of the new groups were formed in the
15southern regions, that is the area in which the FSM was organisationally and
electorally at its weakest. Apparently, a ‘bandwagon effect’ contributed to reducing
the gap between north and south.
d) The peculiar position of this new actor in the political spectrum (declaring
itself beyond left and right), which made it a ‘catch-all’ party in a country where
20the electorate was still very polarised around the left-right cleavage (anti-commu-
nism vs anti-berlusconism) and where voter swings between the opposed coalitions
were extremely limited.38 As Carbone and Newell put it, “voting in Italy,
apparently, has ceased to be an act of faith and has become a means of sanctioning
traditional parties”.39 According to Bordignon and Ceccarini, the current votes for
25the FSM came in three different waves: firstly from the far and moderate left and
the area of abstention (until the local elections of May 2012), then from the
right (Lega Nord and Popolo della Libertà; May 2012) and, finally, from the
centre-left (general elections; February 2013).40 As observed by Ilvo Diamanti,
the movement
30does away with the distinction between left and right and between north and south,
but also between centre and periphery. It is not by chance that it attracts voters from
all political and territorial areas … it has a social interclassist base … it is the most
voted party among entrepreneurs and self-employed workers (44 percent), among the
35At the time of writing (24 September 2013) the overall number of active groups on Meetup has increased
to 1,256.
36The geographic areas taken into consideration are the following: North (Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto,
Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Lombardy, Liguria, Piedmont, Val D'Aosta), red area (Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany,
Umbria, Marche), Centre (Lazio, Sardinia, Abruzzo, Molise), South (Campania, Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria,
Sicily).
37Pinto and Vignati, “Il successo e i dilemmi”.
38Natale, “Comportamento elettorale: fedeltà leggera”.
39Carbone and Newell, “The (apparent) calm”, 103.
40Bordignon and Ceccarini, “Tsunami’ a 5 stelle”.
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working class (38 percent) but also among the unemployed (40 percent). Among
5 freelance professionals (32 percent) and students (28 percent).41
e) Basing its program on the oversimplification of complex problems,42 focusing
on a limited set of themes (including neo-environmentalism, anti-establishment
and moralising discourse, guaranteed income, direct democracy through the inter-
net), making populist appeals, clearly indicating its “enemies” (traditional parties,
10 politicians and journalists), and avoiding taking stances on sensitive issues like
immigration and foreign policy. As for the latter, Dehousse noted that
international issues were conspicuously absent ... on various occasions, Grillo claimed
to be against retaining the Euro at all costs, and even proposed a referendum on this
issue. In other words, in line with the movement’s emphasis on local issues, Euro-
15 pean integration was perceived as a constraint rather than as an opportunity.43
According to Diamanti Grillo mixed two different elements as he “‘nationalised’
local movements on ‘common goods’ and nationalist and anti(European)
resentment”.44
The FSM and anti-establishment parties in Europe
20 Although the FSM’s success has been mostly unexpected, other European countries
have also experienced changes in their party system recently with the emergence of
more or less successful anti-establishment political parties. The economic crisis
opened a window of opportunity for political outsiders in many European democ-
racies. However, these opportunities have been taken by different political entrepre-
25 neurs in different countries: already existing fringe parties, such as the UKIP in
UK and Golden Dawn in Greece, but also new political parties that have emerged
since 2004, such as Syriza in Greece, the Piraten Partei (PP) and Alternative für
Deutschland (AfD) in Germany. Although these parties have some features in com-
mon they also display important differences and cannot be considered as forming a
30 new party family.
The Piraten Partei (formed in September 2006 in Berlin) is probably the politi-
cal actor that is most similar to the FSM for its use of the internet as organisational
instrument, its emphasis on participatory democracy, its political positioning
beyond left and right and its anti-elitism.45 However, it is distinct from Grillo’s
35 party in that it is not based on a charismatic leadership and hierarchical decision-
making. While party leadership has changed frequently in the PP since its founda-
tion, the FSM could probably not survive as a party with mass support without
41Diamanti, “Una mappa della crisi”, xvii-xix.
42Corbetta, “Web-populismo dal destino incerto”.
43Dehousse, “Negative Europeanisation”.
44Diamanti, “Una mappa della crisi”, xvi.
45Hartleb, “Digital campaigning and anti-elitism”.
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Grillo. Moreover, in the PP strategic decisions are not made through the internet
but in open and frequent face-to-face assemblies that anyone is free to attend. In
5the FSM, the political strategy is defined by only two people (Grillo and Casaleg-
gio), who sporadically call online consultations on specific topics (selection of
candidates for elections and expulsion of dissidents).
The other parties are different from the FSM in that they tend to position
themselves on the left-right cleavage: AfD, UKIP and Golden Dawn on the right
10and far right and Syriza on the far left. Nonetheless, one common trait of all these
parties is their anti-establishment rhetoric and their criticism of the European mon-
etary union. All tend to protest against the current (mal)functioning of representa-
tive democracy at the national and European level and a few of them are similar in
terms of their conception of democracy: Syriza, the PP and the FSM call for direct
15participation of citizens in political processes and claim that representative democ-
racy could be improved (and even overcome) by “injections” of direct democratic
practices. However, important differences between democratic visions and real prac-
tices have emerged: both PP and FSM have had problems in making such claims
effective. These problems are related to their democratic procedures. Because of its
20horizontal organisation, the PP’s leaders are relatively powerless and often criticised
by members as the party is based on an assemblarian model that has proved
chaotic and ineffective. The FSM, on the other hand, does not convene general
assemblies, reserving participation for registered members and limiting it to
sporadic online consultations.
25The other anti-establishment parties do not present particular innovations from
the point of view of their democratic conceptions and practices.
Significant differences among these parties can also be found in their manifestos:
most of them sprang up around single issues neglected by existing parties – FSM
(the environment), PP (internet freedom and privacy), UKIP (euro-scepticism) etc.
30– and have broadened their thematic focus over time.
Finally, scholars have questioned whether the FSM belongs to the family of neo-
populist parties. Some have stressed features (such as direct appeal to the people,
oversimplification of complex problems, Manichean vision of reality, charismatic
leadership etc.) that would clearly qualify it as populist,46 while others have under-
35lined specific traits (such as emphasis on direct participation and civic engagement,
a different social base, etc.) that would make it quite distinct47. Be that as it may,
populist parties tend to emerge during the (economic, political and moral) crises of
democratic regimes. It has been noted that in these phases they suddenly become
attractive and successful, but because they fail to come through on their promises
46Corbetta, “Web-populismo dal destino incerto”.
47Biorcio and Natale, Politica a 5 stelle.
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5 and because they lack government experience, they generally decline just as
quickly.48
Falling stars?
This article has focused on the contextual characteristics that generated a window
of opportunity for Grillo’s party, namely economic crisis, austerity measures and
10 corruption scandals. Four different phases in the life of the movement have been
discussed: from latency and invisibility on the internet (2005-07), to mass rallies
(2007-08), from the entry into the electoral arena (2008-11) to the electoral boom
and institutionalization (since 2012). Among the reasons for Grillo’s success are the
movement’s particular communication strategies, internet-based organisation,
15 political positioning beyond left and right and restricted thematic focus.
The FSM’s future prospects are related to contextual changes as well as to the
party’s specific inner developments.49 On the one hand, the capacity of the Italian
party system to reform itself will determine the opportunities for the movement
and, on the other, the FSM’s ability to prove its capacity to govern, to keep an
20 extremely heterogeneous constituency united and to identify the proper means to
deal with dissent will define its future development.
The issue of internal democracy and management of dissent is a particularly deli-
cate one. The online primaries held in December 2012 to select the movements’
candidates for parliament were very problematic in terms of participation, inclusivi-
25 ty and transparency.50 Only after reiterated pressure from FSM members and jour-
nalists did Grillo display the overall number of participants in the election
(20,252). However, data on votes gained during these primaries by individual can-
didates (on average 133 each) have never been made public. The entire electoral
process was managed by Grillo’s staff. No form of external control was possible,
30 which means that data could easily have been manipulated.
Concerning the movement’s effectiveness in representative institutions, problems
have surfaced both at the national and the local level. The sizeable numerical
presence in the national parliament have not yet translated into significant policy
proposals as most attention was initially focused on cuts in MPs’ salaries and expul-
35 sion of dissidents. Concerning local governments, the case of the city of Parma is
very telling. During the electoral campaign, Grillo promised that, in case of a vic-
tory of the FSM, the ongoing construction of an incinerator would be stopped.
One year later, the incinerator was finally built and came into operation. The diffi-
cult financial situation inherited by the previous administration has been dealt with
40 by raising municipal taxes and the cost of social services.
48Taggart, Populism; Mény and Surel. Democracies and the Populist Challenge.
49Bordignon and Ceccarini, “Five Stars and a Cricket”.
50Mosca, Vaccari and Valeriani, “Le ‘parlamentarie’ del 5 stelle”.
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Another problematic aspect concerns the relation between Grillo and
movement’s representatives. Some of them have been expelled because they
denounced the lack of internal democracy and criticised the leader. A proposal
concerning the abolition of the law making illegal entry into the country a crime
5put forward in parliament by two of the movement’s MPs were declared by Grillo
and Casaleggio as “solely personal … because a spokesperson cannot assume the
right to make such an important decision in relation to an issue that is of such
concern socially, without have prior consultation with people”.51 Grillo deliberately
avoids tackling divisive issues like immigration which could easily split his
10extremely diverse electorate.
Criticism of Grillo’s posts expressed on his blog are often removed by his staff
even if they are made by certified users and are not expressed in offensive language.
Critical comments have been attributed to “hordes of trolls, of fakes, of
multi-nicks” and defined as “squirts of digital shit”.52
15After postponing it several times, at the end of October 2013, Grillo and his
staff launched the “operative system”, an online platform that should allow
registered users to interact with the movement’s MPs to amend existing bills and
propose new legislation. This could be seen as an effort to engage members in the
institutional process of law formation. However, reading, managing and merging
20thousands of comments on this online platform and accommodating them in an
institutional framework will not be an easy task.
Thus, the future development and prospects of the movement will depend on its
capacity to address the issue of internal democracy adequately and provide effective
responses to the desire for participation expressed by a significant part of its
25supporters.
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